
Patch
OfficialFreeGenerate candidate fixes for security vulnerabilities.
Free · Opens the source repo
What Patch does
The Patch skill is designed to help developers and security teams generate candidate fixes for verified security findings in their codebases. It operates by consuming various JSON files that contain security findings, such as TRIAGE.json, VULN-FINDINGS.json, and INCIDENTS.json. The skill processes these findings to create inert diffs, which are stored in a designated PATCHES directory for human review. This ensures that no changes are automatically applied to the target repository, maintaining a clear separation between automated patch generation and manual review processes.
The skill functions as the third leg of a static pipeline that begins with vulnerability scanning and triage. It transforms a ranked list of verified findings into candidate diffs, which can then be reviewed and applied by developers. This process is crucial for maintaining code integrity and security, as it allows teams to address vulnerabilities systematically while ensuring that all changes are thoroughly vetted before implementation.
Users can invoke the Patch skill with specific arguments to tailor the patching process to their needs. For example, they can specify the findings path, limit the number of patches generated based on severity, or target specific findings by ID. The skill also supports two modes of operation: execution-verified mode and static mode, allowing it to adapt based on the input provided. This versatility makes it suitable for various scenarios, from automated security assessments to manual vulnerability management.
Overall, the Patch skill is an essential tool for developers and security professionals looking to enhance their vulnerability management workflows. By generating candidate fixes that require human review, it helps teams to close the loop on security triage and ensure that their code remains secure and maintainable.
When to use it
Use this skill when you need to generate patches for verified security findings from a vulnerability scan or triage process.
When not to use it
This skill is not suitable for directly applying patches to a codebase or for unverified findings, as it only produces inert diffs for manual review.
What you can build with it
Automated Vulnerability Management
Integrate the Patch skill into your CI/CD pipeline to automatically generate candidate fixes for security findings during the development process.
Manual Review of Security Patches
Use the Patch skill to generate inert diffs for security vulnerabilities, allowing your team to review and apply changes manually.
Targeted Patching of High-Severity Vulnerabilities
Utilize the --top flag to focus on the most critical vulnerabilities, ensuring that your team addresses high-severity issues first.
How to install Patch
View source1. Install with the skills CLI
npx skills add anthropics/defending-code-reference-harness/patch --agent claude-code2. Or install it manually
Download the skill folder and drop it into ~/.claude/skills/ for all projects, or .claude/skills/ to scope it to one repo. Restart Claude Code so it picks up the new skill.
Anthropic's agentic coding CLI, and the reference implementation of Agent Skills. Drop a skill folder into ~/.claude/skills and Claude Code loads it automatically whenever a task matches the skill's description. Claude Code docs
Inside SKILL.md
Written by anthropicspatch
Third leg of the static pipeline (/vuln-scan → /triage → /patch).
Turns a ranked list of verified findings into candidate diffs.
The skill never applies a diff to the target repo. Output is inert text
in ./PATCHES/ for a human to review and apply out-of-band — see
docs/patching.md#reviewing-generated-patches. There is no --apply or
--approve flag by design: the capability isn't present, so it can't be
prompt-injected into use.
Invoke with /patch <findings-path> [--repo PATH] [--top N] [--id fNNN] [--model M] [--fresh].
Arguments (parse from $ARGUMENTS):
- findings path (first positional, required):
TRIAGE.json,VULN-FINDINGS.json, a pipelineresults/<target>/<ts>/directory, or any JSON the/triageingest table recognizes. --repo PATH: target codebase, read-only (default cwd). Required for static mode; the skill stops if cited files don't resolve under it.--top N: patch only the N highest-severity true positives (static mode).--id fNNN: patch only the finding with this id.--model M: passed through tovuln-pipeline patchin execution-verified mode. Ignored in static mode (subagents inherit the orchestrator's model).--fresh: ignore./.patch-state/checkpoint and start over.
Tools. Prefer Read, Glob, Grep, Write, Task. Some sessions do not
provision Glob or Grep; allowed-tools is a permission filter, not a loader.
When they are unavailable, fall back to the read-only Bash commands
whitelisted above: rg/grep for search, ls for enumeration,
head/file/wc for sniffing, jq for JSON ingest. Bash is otherwise
permitted only for python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py (state I/O)
and vuln-pipeline patch (execution-verified delegate). find is NOT
permitted.
Write scope. The Write tool may target ONLY paths under ./PATCHES/ and
./.patch-state/. Never write into --repo, never git apply, never
patch, never edit target source. If a step seems to require it, the step is
wrong.
Checkpointing (runs before Phase 0 and after every phase)
State persists to ./.patch-state/ so a fresh /patch session resumes
without re-spawning patch or reviewer subagents. All checkpoint I/O goes
through python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py (atomic, JSON-validated).
The Write→--from pattern keeps repo-derived bytes out of Bash argv; never
pass payload via heredoc or stdin.
State files: progress.json (single source of truth: {"status": "running"|"complete", "phase_done": N, "shards_done": [...]}),
phaseN.json, _chunk.tmp.
Start of run. Bash:
python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py load ./.patch-state
status == "absent"OR"complete", OR--freshin$ARGUMENTS→ fresh start. Bash:python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py reset ./.patch-state, proceed to Phase 0.status == "running"withphase_done == N→ resume. Readphase0.json..phaseN.jsonin order (and anyshard_*.jsonlisted inshards_done), merge into working state, printResuming from checkpoint: Phase N complete, skip to Phase N+1. Do not re-spawn any subagent whose output is already checkpointed.
End of every phase N. Write tool → ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp with the
phase's JSON, then Bash:
python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py save ./.patch-state <N> <name> --from ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp
End of run. After writing PATCHES.md and PATCHES.json, Bash:
python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py done ./.patch-state 4
Phase 0: Parse arguments and detect mode
0a. Parse $ARGUMENTS
Extract findings path (first positional), --repo (default .), --top,
--id, --model, --fresh. If no findings path, stop and ask.
0b. Detect mode
Inspect the findings path:
- execution-verified mode when the path is a directory containing
reports/manifest.jsonlORfound_bugs.jsonlORrun_*/result.json(pipeline output) — unless anINCIDENTS.jsonis present anywhere in it: D&R run dirs also containrun_*/result.json, and their incidents route static. The findings have PoC bytes + ASAN traces + reproduction commands; the pipeline's verification ladder applies. - static mode otherwise:
TRIAGE.json,VULN-FINDINGS.json,INCIDENTS.json(the/dnr-*output), generic finding JSON, or markdown. No PoC; the oracle is a fresh-context reviewer.
Record mode in working state. The two modes share Phase 1 ingest then fork
at Phase 2.
Checkpoint: Write tool → ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp:
{"phase": 0, "mode": "exec"|"static", "args": {repo, top, id, model, findings_path}}
Then Bash:
python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py save ./.patch-state 0 mode --from ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp
Phase 1: Ingest and normalize
Same input contract as /triage Phase 1. Normalize every input format to a
flat findings[] of dicts. Pull what's present; never guess what's absent.
1a. Recognized containers (priority order)
TRIAGE.json— read.findings[]. Filter toverdict == "true_positive". This is the canonical input: already verified, deduped, ranked, owner-tagged.VULN-FINDINGS.json— read.findings[]. Unverified; printWarning: VULN-FINDINGS.json is unverified scanner output. Consider /triage first.and continue.INCIDENTS.json(the/dnr-hunt//dnr-respondoutput) — same mapping as/triage1a: one finding per.incidents[]entry, nestedvuln.file/vuln.line/vuln.type→file/line/category,description←vuln.mechanismplusimpact, and keeppoc— aconfirmed_exploitedincident'spoc.commandis the regression check for its fix. The top-levelruled_outarray is not findings. PrintWarning: INCIDENTS.json has not been triaged. Consider /triage first.and continue. No-fileincidents follow 1c like any other finding.- Pipeline results directory — one finding per
reports/bug_NN/. Mapreport.json→description,crash.crash_type→category, ASAN top-frame →file/line. Recordbug_id = NNfor the--bug Ndelegate flag. - Generic
*.jsonwith a top-level list or afindings/results/issues/vulnerabilitiesarray.
1b. Field aliases (canonical ← also-accept)
| Canonical | Also accept |
|---|---|
file | path, location.file, filename |
line | line_number, location.line, lineno |
category | type, cwe, rule_id, crash_type |
severity | severity_rating, level, priority |
title | name, summary, message |
description | details, report, body, evidence, rationale |
recommendation | fix, remediation, mitigation |
owner_hint | owner, component |
Attach id (f001, f002, ... in ingest order; preserve existing ids from
TRIAGE.json) and source (relative path of the file it came from).
1c. Filter and order
- If
--id fNNN: keep only that finding. - If
--top N(static mode): sort byseverityHIGH > MEDIUM > LOW thenconfidencedesc, keep the first N. - Drop findings with no
file(cannot patch what cannot be located). Record them asskippedwith reason"no source location".
1d. Locate the target codebase (static mode)
Resolve --repo. For the first 5 findings with a file, check the path
resolves under repo (try as-given, then with common prefixes stripped). If
none resolve, stop: tell the user the cited files aren't reachable and
suggest a --repo value.
Checkpoint: Write tool → ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp:
{"phase": 1, "mode": ..., "findings": [...], "skipped": [...], "repo": ...}
Then Bash:
python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py save ./.patch-state 1 ingest --from ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp
Phase 2: Generate patches
Forks on mode.
2A. Execution-verified mode — delegate to the pipeline
The pipeline already implements the build → reproduce → regress → re-attack ladder with executable oracles. Do not reimplement it.
For each finding (or once for the whole directory if no --id/--top
filter), Bash:
vuln-pipeline patch <findings_path> --model <--model arg> [--bug <bug_id>]
The pipeline writes <findings_path>/reports/bug_NN/{patch.diff, patch_result.json} itself. After it returns, Read each patch_result.json
and copy verdict + rationale into working state. Set
verified: "ladder_passed" when verdict.passed == true, else
verified: "ladder_failed".
If the CLI exits non-zero (no build_command, missing target config), record
the stderr as the finding's error and continue with remaining findings.
Skip Phase 3 (the ladder is the verifier). Proceed to Phase 4.
Checkpoint per finding: Write tool → ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp =
{"id": ..., "verified": ..., "verdict": ..., "diff_path": ...}, then Bash:
python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py shard ./.patch-state <id> --from ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp.
After all findings, write the consolidated phase payload to _chunk.tmp then:
python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py save ./.patch-state 2 generate --from ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp
2B. Static mode — one patch subagent per finding
One Task per finding, all in a SINGLE assistant message for parallel
execution. subagent_type: "general-purpose". Never set
run_in_background — you need the diff text, not an async handle.
Each subagent has read-only access to --repo. It cannot modify the target;
it emits the diff as text in its response. The orchestrator writes that text
to PATCHES/bug_NN/patch.diff.
Patch subagent prompt (assemble once, reuse per finding)
You are conducting authorized security research as part of a defensive
assessment. Your task: write a candidate fix for ONE verified vulnerability
finding in a codebase you have read-only access to.
You may use Read, Glob, and Grep ONLY on paths inside {REPO_PATH}. You may
NOT build, run, install, edit files on disk, or reach the network. You will
emit the fix as a unified diff in your final response; you will NOT apply it.
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FINDING:
id: {id}
file: {file}
line: {line}
category: {category}
severity: {severity}
title: {title}
description:
{description}
recommendation:
{recommendation or "(none provided)"}
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PROCEDURE:
1. READ THE CODE. Open {file} at line {line} and the surrounding function.
Understand what the code does — do not trust the finding's description as
the only source.
2. ROOT CAUSE FIRST. Trace backward from the cited sink to where the bad
value or missing check originates. The fix usually belongs there, not at
the line the scanner flagged. Name the root-cause location (file:line).
3. VARIANT HUNT. Grep for sibling call sites with the same pattern. Your fix
should cover all of them, or your rationale should say why not.
4. MINIMAL DIFF. Smallest change that fixes the root cause. No refactoring,
no drive-by cleanup, no reformatting, no comment-only changes. Match the
surrounding code's style (brace placement, naming, error handling).
5. ADVERSARIAL SELF-CHECK. Re-read your diff as an attacker. Name one input
variation that would reach the same bad state without tripping your
change. If you can name one, your fix is at the wrong layer — go back to
step 2.
6. REGRESSION TEST. As part of the diff, add ONE test case that fails before
your change and passes after — placed wherever the project keeps its
tests (look for test_*/, *_test.*, tests/, spec/). If no test directory
exists, omit the test and say so in <test_note>.
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
OUTPUT — your final response MUST contain exactly these tags. Emit the diff
verbatim between the markers; do NOT wrap it in ``` fences.
<patch_diff>
--- a/path/to/file
+++ b/path/to/file
@@ ... @@
context line
-removed line
+added line
</patch_diff>
<rationale>what changed and why, mechanically — file:line of root cause,
what the change enforces</rationale>
<variants_checked>file:function pairs you grepped for the same
pattern, and whether each needed the fix</variants_checked>
<bypass_considered>the input variation you tried in step 5 and why it
no longer reaches the bad state</bypass_considered>
<test_note>where the regression test landed, or why none was
added</test_note>
If you determine the finding is NOT fixable as described (wrong file, code
already patched, finding is a false positive), emit:
<patch_diff>NONE</patch_diff>
<rationale>why no patch is appropriate</rationale>
Spawn
For each finding in findings[], build a Task call with the prompt above
(substituting {REPO_PATH}, {id}, {file}, {line}, {category},
{severity}, {title}, {description}, {recommendation}).
description: "patch {id}".
If len(findings) > ~40, shard into sequential batches of ~40 (each batch
one message). Per-finding shard checkpoint after each result is parsed.
If any Task call returns status: "async_launched" instead of the
subagent's text, the runtime backgrounded it. Pick one recovery and use it
for the whole batch:
- If completion notifications arrive in your conversation: parse each
subagent's tagged blocks from its notification
resultas it lands. Do not end your turn until every finding is accounted for. - If notifications do not arrive: do NOT poll transcript files. Re-spawn the missing patch subagents in a fresh Task batch (smaller shard, e.g. 10) and use the synchronous results. The same recovery applies to reviewer subagents in Phase 3.
Parse
From each Task result, extract the five tagged blocks. Tolerate leading/
trailing whitespace, stray ``` fences, and HTML-escaped entities (<
> & — some runtimes escape angle brackets in notification
payloads; unescape before writing the diff). If <patch_diff> is NONE or
empty,
mark status: "no_patch". Otherwise write the diff text to
./PATCHES/bug_NN/patch.diff (NN = zero-padded index in sorted order) and
record rationale, variants_checked, bypass_considered, test_note.
Checkpoint per finding: Write tool → ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp =
{"id": ..., "bug_nn": "NN", "status": ..., "rationale": ..., ...}, then Bash:
python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py shard ./.patch-state <id> --from ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp.
After all findings, write the consolidated phase payload to _chunk.tmp then:
python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py save ./.patch-state 2 generate --from ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp
Phase 3: Independent review (static mode only)
One reviewer subagent per generated diff, all in ONE message,
subagent_type: "general-purpose".
The reviewer never sees the finding's description, recommendation, or
the patch author's rationale. It gets only {file, line, category}
plus the raw diff bytes, and re-derives whether the diff is a minimal,
in-scope fix by reading the source itself. This keeps any instructions
embedded in finding prose from reaching both the author and the gate.
Reviewer prompt (assemble once, reuse per diff)
You are reviewing a candidate security patch as a maintainer would. You have
read-only access to the unpatched source at {REPO_PATH}. You may use Read,
Glob, Grep. You may NOT build, run, or apply the diff.
You have NOT seen the scanner's description of the vulnerability or the
patch author's reasoning. Work only from the location, the category, and the
diff.
LOCATION: {file}:{line}
CATEGORY: {category}
DIFF UNDER REVIEW:
<diff>
{diff_text — or, for diffs over ~50 lines, replace this block with:
"Read the diff at ./PATCHES/bug_NN/patch.diff" and let the reviewer Read it}
</diff>
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
ANSWER FOUR QUESTIONS:
1. SCOPE. Does the diff touch only files/functions on the path between
{file}:{line} and its callers? List any hunk that falls outside that
path.
2. SUPPRESSION. Does the diff fix a root cause, or does it suppress the
symptom (try/except: pass, early-return on a magic value, deleting the
check that fired, lowering a log level)?
3. NEW SURFACE. Does the diff add parsing, trust a new input field, weaken
validation elsewhere, or remove a security-relevant check?
4. STYLE. 0-10: would you merge this as-is?
0-3 wrong layer / suppression; 4-6 correct but noisy; 7-10 minimal,
targeted, matches surrounding style.
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
End your response with EXACTLY:
REVIEW: ACCEPT | REJECT
STYLE_SCORE: <0-10>
OUT_OF_SCOPE_HUNKS: <comma-separated file:line, or none>
REASON: <2-4 sentences citing specific diff hunks and source lines>
ACCEPT requires: in-scope, root-cause fix, no new attack surface,
style >= 5. Otherwise REJECT.
Spawn and parse
One Task per finding with status != "no_patch". Parse the trailing block.
Attach review, style_score, out_of_scope_hunks, review_reason to the
finding. Set verified: "static_review_only" for every static-mode result
regardless of ACCEPT/REJECT — the label describes the verification class,
not the outcome.
Checkpoint: Write tool → ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp:
{"phase": 3, "findings": [...]}
Then Bash:
python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py save ./.patch-state 3 review --from ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp
Phase 4: Output
4a. Per-finding patch_result.json
For each finding (both modes), Write
./PATCHES/bug_NN/patch_result.json:
{
"id": "f003",
"source": "TRIAGE.json#2",
"title": "...",
"file": "...",
"line": 0,
"category": "...",
"severity": "HIGH",
"owner_hint": "...",
"mode": "exec" | "static",
"verified": "ladder_passed" | "ladder_failed" | "static_review_only",
"review": "ACCEPT" | "REJECT" | null,
"style_score": 0,
"out_of_scope_hunks": [],
"rationale": "...",
"variants_checked": "...",
"bypass_considered": "...",
"test_note": "...",
"review_reason": "...",
"verdict": { "t0_builds": true, "...": "(exec mode only, from pipeline)" }
}
In exec mode, also Read the pipeline's
<findings_path>/reports/bug_NN/patch.diff and Write its bytes to
./PATCHES/bug_NN/patch.diff so both modes land in the same place.
4b. ./PATCHES.json
{
"patch_completed": true,
"mode": "exec" | "static",
"repo": "...",
"summary": {
"input_count": 0,
"patched": 0,
"no_patch": 0,
"accepted": 0,
"rejected": 0,
"ladder_passed": 0
},
"findings": [ { ...patch_result.json shape... } ]
}
4c. ./PATCHES.md (incremental)
Step 1 — header. Write tool → ./PATCHES.md (clobbers prior):
# Candidate Patches
{if mode == "static":}
> **Static review only.** These diffs were authored and reviewed by
> independent agents reading source. They were NOT compiled, run, or
> re-attacked. Read each diff yourself before applying — see
> `docs/patching.md#reviewing-generated-patches` for what to look for.
{if mode == "exec":}
> **Execution-verified.** Each diff passed (or failed) the pipeline
> verification ladder: build → reproduce → regress → re-attack. The ladder
> proves the crash is gone, not that the diff introduces no new problems.
**Input:** {findings_path} · **Repo:** {repo} · {N} findings → {M} diffs
---
Step 2 — per finding (sorted: ACCEPT/ladder_passed first, then by
severity). Write ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp:
## bug_{NN}: [{severity}] {title} ({id})
`{file}:{line}` · {category} · owner: {owner_hint or "?"}
**Status:** {verified} · review {review or "n/a"} · style {style_score or "n/a"}/10
**Diff:** `PATCHES/bug_{NN}/patch.diff` ({hunk count} hunks, {line count} lines)
**Rationale:** {rationale}
**Variants checked:** {variants_checked}
**Bypass considered:** {bypass_considered}
{if review == "REJECT":}
> **Rejected by reviewer:** {review_reason}
{if out_of_scope_hunks:}
> **Out-of-scope hunks:** {out_of_scope_hunks}
---
Then checkpoint.py append ./PATCHES.md --from ./.patch-state/_chunk.tmp.
Step 3 — footer. Append a ## Skipped table for findings with no file
or status == "no_patch", one line each with the reason.
Checkpoint (final): Bash:
python3 .claude/skills/_lib/checkpoint.py done ./.patch-state 4
4d. Terminal summary
Under ~10 lines:
Patches generated ({mode} mode): {N} findings → {M} diffs.
Accepted: {n} {title of top accepted}
Rejected: {n}
No patch: {n}
{if exec:} Ladder passed: {n}/{M}
Wrote ./PATCHES/bug_NN/, ./PATCHES.md, ./PATCHES.json
{if static:} These are drafts. Review before applying — see docs/patching.md.
Guard rails
- The skill never applies diffs. No
git apply, nopatch, no Edit against--repo. If you find yourself needing to, the design is wrong. - Write only under
./PATCHES/and./.patch-state/. - Reviewer isolation. The reviewer prompt receives
{file, line, category, diff}and nothing else from the finding. Do not pass itdescription,recommendation,exploit_scenario, or the patch author'srationale. - Always set
subagent_type. Forking would leak every finding's prose into every patch subagent. - All Task calls for a phase in ONE message. Serial spawning is correct but N× slower.
- Checkpoint before starting the next phase, every time.
- Exec mode delegates, never reimplements. If
vuln-pipeline patchisn't on PATH, stop and tell the user; don't fall back to static mode silently.
Testing this skill
Static mode against the canary fixture:
/vuln-scan targets/canary
/triage VULN-FINDINGS.json --repo targets/canary --auto
/patch TRIAGE.json --repo targets/canary --top 3
Expected: three diffs under PATCHES/bug_00..02/, each
verified: "static_review_only", review: ACCEPT, style ≥ 7 for the
planted overflow/UAF/format-string bugs.
Execution-verified mode against pipeline output:
vuln-pipeline run drlibs --runs 3 --parallel --stream --model <m>
/patch results/drlibs/<ts>/ --model <m>
Expected: delegates to vuln-pipeline patch, surfaces
verified: "ladder_passed" per bug, copies diffs into ./PATCHES/.
Design notes
- TRIAGE.json is canonical input because patching unverified findings wastes tokens on false positives. VULN-FINDINGS.json is accepted with a warning for convenience.
- Static mode emits a regression test inside the diff rather than running it. The skill cannot execute target code (constraint of the static pipeline); the test is for the human who applies the diff.
- Reviewer never sees finding prose. Target source can contain
injected instructions that survive into a scanner's
descriptionfield. The patch author sees that prose (it has to, to know what to fix); the reviewer doesn't, so injected text cannot pass its own gate. verifiedis the verification class, not pass/fail.static_review_onlymeans "an agent read it" regardless of ACCEPT/REJECT.ladder_passed/ladder_failedmeans "ASAN decided." Downstream tooling should branch on this field, not onreview.- Output shape matches the pipeline (
PATCHES/bug_NN/{patch.diff, patch_result.json}) so consumers don't care which mode produced it.
Frequently asked questions about Patch
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